1. China Didn't Need Free Passage Through Hormuz. It Needed Something Better.
Last week we reported that Chinese-flagged vessels were passing freely through the Strait of Hormuz while commercial traffic fell to near zero. That was the assumption. The data tells a different story, and the real one is worse.
The Center for Strategic and International Studies tracked vessel movements through the strait using satellite and AIS data (the automatic identification system that all commercial ships broadcast for tracking and collision avoidance). Before the war, 153 ships transited daily. By March 2, that number fell to 13. Chinese and Hong Kong-flagged vessels dropped from 49 transits in the last week of February to two in the first two weeks of March. Fifty-five Chinese ships remain trapped inside the Persian Gulf. On March 27, Iran turned back two Chinese container vessels near Larak Island. Ships across the region began broadcasting "Chinese owner" and "Chinese crew" on their transponders, a kind of diplomatic bulletproofing that worked for some and not others. Iran announced five nations would receive safe passage: China, Russia, India, Iraq, and Pakistan. In practice, enforcement has been inconsistent. Lloyd's List tracked 26 ships using what it called Iran's "de facto toll booth" since March 13, with passage fees estimated at $2 million per transit. At least two of those payments were made in Chinese yuan. Iran's parliament is working to formalize the process. Deutsche Bank called it "the making of the petroyuan."
China's advantage isn't passage. It's preparation. Beijing spent the last decade building an energy architecture that doesn't depend on a single chokepoint. Russian crude flows through the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean pipeline. Central Asian gas arrives through pipelines from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. Russian pipeline gas exports to China rose 25% to 38.8 billion cubic meters in 2025, surpassing what Russia sends to Europe for the first time. A Myanmar pipeline connects the Indian Ocean coast directly to Yunnan province, bypassing the strait entirely. Chinese oil imports surged 16% in January and February 2026. Combined strategic and commercial stockpiles now sit at roughly 1.2 billion barrels, approximately 100 days of imports. India has 9.5 days.
China was also, until four weeks ago, the fuel supplier for half of Southeast Asia. The Philippines got roughly half its jet fuel from China. Bangladesh, roughly half. Australia, a third. On March 5, Beijing's National Development and Reform Commission ordered all refiners and traders to halt exports of diesel, gasoline, and jet fuel until at least the end of March. The Philippines declared a national energy emergency on March 24. Gasoline breached 100 pesos per liter for the first time in the country's history. Bangladesh is days from running dry. Vietnam has less than 20 days of oil reserves. Vietnam Airlines scaled back Pacific routes.
On March 18, China made the leverage play explicit. The Taiwan Affairs Office announced: "We are willing to provide Taiwan compatriots with stable and reliable energy and resource security, so that they may live better lives." The offer was tied to reunification talks under the "one country, two systems" framework. Taiwan rejected it. President Lai Ching-te said energy supplies were secured through April and announced $44.4 billion in US energy purchases through 2030. But Taiwan imports 96% of its energy by sea. The offer was not charity. It was a demonstration of what China controls and what it can withhold.
The infrastructure for selective supply already exists. China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation, the state-owned company known as Sinopec and the world's largest oil refiner by capacity, has a $3.7 billion refinery deal and 150 fuel stations in Sri Lanka. Chinese firms hold a 90% stake in Laos's power transmission grid under a 25-year concession. A Chinese company is building Cambodia's first oil refinery at $3.5 billion. Belt and Road energy investments hit a record $93.9 billion in 2025, with fossil fuels accounting for 74%.
Chinese grid management carries a second risk beyond dependency. In 2023, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency warned that Volt Typhoon, a Chinese state-sponsored group, had pre-positioned access inside US critical infrastructure including energy systems. Countries accepting Chinese-built grid infrastructure under financial duress are unlikely to conduct the security assessments that took the US intelligence community years to complete on its own systems. Laos didn't just outsource its power grid. It outsourced the attack surface that comes with it.
The countries that depended on Chinese fuel before the crisis are breaking under its absence. Sri Lanka declared every Wednesday a public holiday on March 16. Six weeks of fuel reserves. Fuel prices up 33% since the war began. Pakistan closed schools across three provinces and put half its civil servants on work-from-home. Its wheat harvest begins in April, and fuel-dependent agricultural costs will drive food inflation into households that have almost no capacity left to absorb it. Egypt hiked petrol, diesel, and cooking gas prices 15-22% and ordered malls and shops to close by 9 PM on weekdays. Nigeria recorded a 39.5% fuel price increase between February 23 and March 16.
Brent crude, the international benchmark oil price, closed at $112.57 on March 28. The Dallas Federal Reserve projects the disruption will cut global GDP growth by 2.9 percentage points in the second quarter. The International Energy Agency coordinated the largest strategic petroleum reserve release in history, 400 million barrels led by 172 million from the United States, but delivery takes 120 days. The demand destruction economists predicted at $120 oil is already happening. Just not in the countries that can afford it.